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ALABAMA LAW REVIEW 
Volume 58 2007 Number 4 
HOW TO CREATE—OR DESTROY—WEALTH                               
IN REAL PROPERTY 
Richard A. Epstein* 
PROPERTY RIGHTS—PRIVATE PROPERTY AND CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 
It is a commonplace observation among writers, like myself, in the clas-
sical liberal tradition that strong and well-defined property rights are an 
indispensable precondition for the creation of wealth, and through it human 
happiness and satisfaction. In most contexts, this proposition is stated as a 
universal truth, which is not dependent on the particular circumstances of 
any given culture. A more popular version of this proposition is attributable 
to Sophie Tucker, who said (rightly): “I’ve been rich, and I’ve been poor. 
Believe me, honey, rich is better.”1 Her vivid generalization, which is at-
tacked by many on the grounds that the crude obsession with material 
wealth pays insufficient attention to the critical variations among cultures, 
strikes me as about right. Writ large, the concern with wealth makes pretty 
good sense, even though on particular issues—such as the care of impover-
ished infant children—it does not furnish a suitable guide for decision.2 To 
be sure, it is easy to note that different forms of natural resources may well 
require different systems of property rights, as with water. But that proposi-
tion holds true only with respect to the physical variations in natural re-
sources, whereby a riparian regime that works for gentle English rivers will 
not do well on the raging Colorado River. In the end, the same physical 
  
 * James Parker Hall Distinguished Service Professor of Law, The University of Chicago; Peter 
and Kirsten Bedford Senior Fellow, The Hoover Institution. This Essay is based on a lecture given at 
The University of Alabama School of Law as part of the Meador Lectures on Wealth. My thanks to 
David Strandness, Stanford Law School, 2007, for his insightful editing on an earlier draft. And to 
Corina Wilder, University of Chicago Law School, class of 2008, for reviewing the last version of the 
manuscript.  
 1. Carole Goldberg, The Red-Hot Mama, HARTFORD COURANT, Aug. 14, 2003, at D1. 
 2. For the medical parallel, see RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, MORTAL PERIL: OUR INALIENABLE RIGHT 
TO HEALTH CARE? 31-37 (1997). For the leading economic defense of wealth maximization, see Richard 
A. Posner, Utilitarianism, Economics, and Legal Theory, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 103 (1979), and for the 
criticism, see Ronald M. Dworkin, Is Wealth a Value?, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 191 (1980). 
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environment is likely to give rise to the same solutions in all sorts of differ-
ent cultures. What is needed is some basic understanding of how property 
rights foster the creation of wealth.  
In this Essay, I propose to offer a general account of property rights in 
land,3 which starts from first principles and builds up from there to the 
complex property arrangements that can work in the modern state. But just 
as there is growth, there is also pathology, so it is equally critical to under-
stand how modern legal regulation all too often destroys wealth by inhibit-
ing the rights of use and disposition that were part of the common law bun-
dle of rights. The central thesis of this Essay runs as follows: The common 
law tradition, broadly conceived, did a good job in dealing with the devel-
opment of property rights in land.4 The constitutional protection of property 
rights consciously departs from that system and creates a weak, inconsis-
tent, gap-ridden system that opens up vast opportunities for political in-
trigue. Note these key contrasts. 
The backbone of the common law system of property rights is the rule 
of first possession, which allows individuals to acquire property over which 
they enjoy rights of use or disposition. Thereafter, the rules governing con-
flicts of use between neighbors tended to maximize the value of all plots of 
land subject to the common regime. It achieved this result by a system of 
successive approximations.5 Law started off with a system of strong bound-
ary conditions between neighbors and then allowed for the emergent system 
to vary in two ways. One of these was coercive, whereby the state added or 
subtracted rights from the initial bundle for all holders equally. The key 
condition was to deviate from the hard-edged boundaries under circum-
stances where it produced gains shared equally by all parties. In addition, 
the open rules on disposition allowed for voluntary transactions that com-
bined property interests in ways that further facilitated mutual gains in 
wealth. Over time, a combination of factors has made that system ever more 
versatile: sophisticated drafting by private counsel to get rid of default terms 
that did not quite work out;6 judicial decisions that tend to increase the 
flexibility of covenants and easements;7 and legislation that allows for the 
creation of new forms of property interests, such as time-shares in real es-
tate.8 All of these features tend to strengthen a system with robust, well-
defined, and consistent property rights in land.  
  
 3. For a general discussion, see Robert C. Ellickson, Property in Land, 102 YALE L.J. 1315 (1993). 
 4. For an exposition of this system, see RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, SIMPLE RULES FOR A COMPLEX 
WORLD 53-70 (1995). 
 5. For my more detailed account and a discussion of the variations on the basic rules, see Richard 
A. Epstein, Nuisance Law: Corrective Justice and its Utilitarian Constraints, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 49 
(1979). 
 6. For example, the standard deed provisions on the rule against perpetuities or on the allocation of 
rights between tenants for life and remainderman.  
 7. See, e.g., Neponsit Prop. Owners’ Ass’n v. Emigrant Indus. Sav. Bank, 15 N.E.2d 793 (N.Y. 
1938). 
 8. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. §§ 721.01-.32 (2006).  
File: Epstein Macro Created on: 3/19/2007 2:47 PM Last Printed: 4/13/2007 12:42 PM 
2007] How to Create—or Destroy—Wealth in Real Property 743 
 
These private rules were in turn supplemented by a system of state tak-
ings for public use, with a built-in compensation requirement that essen-
tially allowed for further corrections in any distribution of property rights 
under a rule that, if properly applied, left no one worse off than they were 
prior to the invocation of public force. The receipt of just compensation was 
meant to leave the landowners who lost their property as well off as before. 
The new public property use—the creation of a highway for the benefit of 
all landowners—generated gains that were shared equally across society. 
Sticking to these principles tended to avoid shipwrecks in legal innovation 
while moving wealth, and doubtless utility, to ever higher levels. While the 
standard of wealth is not the be all and end all of social welfare, it works 
especially well with land use transactions, where market values are useful 
proxies to social welfare.  
The modern constitutional treatment of property rights consciously de-
viates from these common law rules.9 Today’s systems of land use regula-
tion, from zoning to environmental protection, are marred by the same 
flaws. First, the “bundle of rights” within the system of property—
exclusion, possession, use, development, and disposition10—are thought to 
be arbitrary and hence worthy of no particular respect if the state should 
think it appropriate to “redefine” property rights without compensation.11 
Under the revised version of the world, “the” property right is the right to 
exclude from occupation. 12 All the other standard incidents of ownership 
are left in constitutional limbo. To use a simple analogy: The common law 
rules sought to give clear rights over both the rind of the orange and its 
fruity contents. The constitutional law uses hard rules to govern the external 
side of matters but insists that the ownership structures do not govern the 
contents, which are left wholly indeterminate: the state cannot use them at 
all, but the individual cannot use them without the consent of the state. The 
common law prided itself on the unity of ownership. The constitutional law 
allows the government to fractionate the unity at will and without financial 
repercussions. 
The doubts about property were matched by movements on other fronts. 
The just compensation requirement is systematically loosened so that many 
elements of value—loss of good will, appraisal fees, and legal fees—are 
kept out of the compensation formula, even when takings are allowed. At 
the same time, the police power definitions are systematically expanded so 
  
 9. For my extended critique, see RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE 
POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN (1985). 
 10. For the usual account of ownership, see A.M. Honoré, Ownership, in OXFORD ESSAYS IN 
JURISPRUDENCE 107, 114-18 (A.G. Guest ed., 1961). See also Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Funda-
mental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16 (1913).  
 11. For an elaboration of this theme, see Eric Claeys, Takings: An Appreciative Retrospective, WM. 
& MARY L. REV. (forthcoming 2007).  
 12. See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, Property and the Right to Exclude, 77 NEB. L. REV. 730 (1998). 
For the internal complexities of that right, see Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Information Asymmetries and the 
Rights to Exclude, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1835 (2006), where the plural, “rights,” is meant to convey differ-
ent senses in which rights to exclude are protected. 
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that any effort to improve the general welfare can suffice, even if not tied to 
the common law conception of nuisance. Taken together, both these devel-
opments substantially weaken property rights, such that the state gains both 
the power to initiate new land use restrictions—which don’t touch the right 
to exclude—without taking into account the harm these restrictions inflict 
on the private owners, who bear the brunt of their losses, all without com-
pensation.  
Clearly there is something amiss in this constitutional reformulation. A 
voluntary market would have ample demand for any property at zero price, 
but no supply. That imbalance works out quite differently in the public 
sphere because the eminent domain law now grants the state the enforceable 
option to purchase at a zero price those incidents of property that do not 
involve the right to exclude. Now the want of a voluntary supply no longer 
matters. All that counts is the demand side. Let any one party gain the uni-
lateral right to acquire property at zero price and, lo and behold, he or she 
consumes too much of the good relative to the costs inflicted. That simple 
observation explains the fatal flaw in the modern law, for governments are 
subject to the same temptations. The removal of any need to compensate for 
the taking of restrictive covenants in land (always a property interest in the 
private law) offers a massive subsidy for government regulation which leads 
to its excessive utilization. No longer is there any built in check in the sys-
tem that insures each authorized government move has some strong possi-
bility of leading to an overall social improvement. The new rule maximizes 
state discretion, not social welfare. It is important to outline both systems in 
some detail. 
STATE OF NATURE THEORY 
Classical and Modern  
The classical literature on property rights approached the topic of prop-
erty rights and state power from state of nature theory. Let us assume that 
all individuals are plunked down on earth in some disorganized array. What 
principles are then appropriate to decide which persons own which external 
resources, and why? It also asks what is the “bundle of rights” that are im-
plicated in the notion of ownership of land or a particular thing. As one 
moves forward into modern times, the question of state of nature theory 
takes on a different coloration as individuals are increasingly worried about 
the preservation of the built heritage and the environment for all inhabitants 
of the world.13  
In practice, these two topics, one old and recurrent and the other one 
new and pressing, are more closely related than is commonly supposed. Any 
accurate account of how property rights emerge from a state of nature car-
  
 13. See, e.g., PRESERVING THE BUILT HERITAGE: TOOLS FOR IMPLEMENTATION (J. Mark Schuster et 
al. eds., 1997). 
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ries with it strong implications on what use rights any property owner may 
have vis-à-vis both his neighbors and the public at large. It also speaks to 
the rights of disposition of that same property. Once these attributes of 
property are fully understood, the role of state enforcement becomes much 
more delimited on such tough questions as zoning and environmental pro-
tection. A strong property rights framework also allows us to answer some 
key questions of institutional design, including the vexed issue of which 
restrictions on the use of property may be imposed as of right, and which 
require the payment of compensation.  
That said, we must be aware of the illusion of progress. Progress is 
nonproblematic in science and math, where once a problem is solved, that 
solution will not be undone by future events. But there is no similar unidi-
rectional feature with respect to the creation and protection of property 
rights, such that societies evolve inexorably in the right direction. Some-
times that is true, as the potential for the division and recombination of 
property rights through voluntary transactions, for example, is well accepted 
in the marketplace. But on other occasions, especially on matters of state 
regulation, the directional signals are much more mixed. There is, alas, a 
constant sentiment in practical and academic circles that older conceptions 
of property rights cannot meet the challenges of a new age.14 Unfortunately, 
the novel views of property rights and the regulations put forward to im-
plement this position are in my view usually counterproductive. All too 
often they result in the destruction of wealth by undermining the old, but 
hardy, common law systems of rights. Unfortunately, I see much of modern 
intellectual and political life as a tension between two strong tendencies. We 
continue to prosper because the improvements of technology offset much of 
the decline of institutional wisdom stemming from the spate of ill-
considered social reforms. But over the long haul, we would do far better if 
we married traditional conceptions of property rights to innovative uses of 
technology. 
Here is one suggestion as to how this might have happened. Eric Claeys 
has argued forcefully that this disintegration of property rights stems from 
the use of the bundle metaphor.15 I have no doubt that the “bundle” phrase 
has lent itself to that purpose—after all, the term “bundle” suggests an arbi-
trary collection of rags (or “sticks”) contained in a single package. The ar-
gument is that using this language made it easier for realists and relativists 
to jettison one version of property rights in favor of another. This arresting 
hypothesis is hard to test. The causal explanation is always clouded because 
the bundling notion has been around for a long time. The Roman law often 
spoke of ownership in terms of the ius utendi, fruendi abutendi—the rights 
  
 14. See, e.g., BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION (1977) (discuss-
ing outmoded conceptions of layman’s property, as opposed to the scientific conception). 
 15. Claeys, supra note 11. For the phrase “disintegration of rights,” see the highly influential essay 
of Thomas C. Grey, The Disintegration of Property, in NOMOS XXII: PROPERTY 69, 69-85 (J. Roland 
Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1980).  
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of use, enjoyment, and abuse. The latter seems a bit out of place here, al-
though the right to destroy does raise important property conceptions,16 but 
in fact the term abutendi—abuse—has been long commonly read to include 
the right of alienation of property as well, just as in the modern law.17 In-
deed, this emphasis on the bundle of rights has been used by the advocates 
of strong property rights, like myself, to say that each stick in the bundle is 
entitled to equal protection,18 so perhaps, conceptual issues influenced the 
transformation in attitudes. On balance, however, I think that, in the end, 
deep social unhappiness about the perceived consequences of private prop-
erty combined with strong political movements to undo the classical legal 
synthesis led to this result.19 That temptation should be stoutly resisted in 
the property area, for the set of rights found in the traditional bundle of 
property rights was far from arbitrary, as each stick in that bundle is needed 
to enhance the value of the whole.  
Bottom-Up or Top-Down  
But how to defend this position as a matter of principle? The first ques-
tion that one asks in state of nature theory is how it is that any person has 
any rights in land at all. That problem is more difficult than is sometimes 
supposed, given that any account of property rights has to explain how one 
person ever comes to obtain rights good against the rest of the world.20 In 
dealing with this question, there are really only two basic approaches to the 
problem, both of which have been used on different occasions. The first of 
these approaches holds that all property is unowned in a state of nature, so 
any individual keeps what he can take on the simple ground that no one else 
has standing to stop him. The system usually works best when there is a 
slow migration of populations into new territories. In the beginning, these 
individuals may space their holdings in order to minimize conflict (but not 
too far lest they undermine the possibilities of cooperation), but with time, 
the remaining land is slowly occupied, so in the end, all persons have 
neighbors, some of whom are strangers with whom they share no ongoing 
consensual arrangements. 
The second approach works in the opposite way. It assumes that all 
property is held in common so that some decision by either unanimous con-
sent or, more realistically, a central authority is needed to convert any, in-
deed every, parcel to private property. It is abundantly clear that unanimous 
  
 16. See Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, The Right to Destroy, 114 YALE L.J. 781 (2005). 
 17. See BARRY NICHOLAS, AN INTRODUCTION TO ROMAN LAW 154 (1962) (pointing out that, in a 
Roman conception of ownership, “‘abuse’ has been construed to include alienation”). 
 18. See Richard A. Epstein, Weak and Strong Conceptions of Property: An Essay in Memory of Jim 
Harris, in PROPERTIES OF LAW: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF JIM HARRIS 97 (Timothy Endicott et al. eds., 
2006). For criticism of this view, see J.W. HARRIS, PROPERTY AND JUSTICE (1996). 
 19. For my account, see RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, HOW PROGRESSIVES REWROTE THE CONSTITUTION 
(2006). For the unhappiness, see Louis D. Brandeis, The Living Law, 10 ILL. L. REV. 461 (1916).  
 20. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROPERTY § 1 (1936) (defining “right” as “a legally enforceable 
claim of one person against another, that the other shall do a given act or shall not do a given act”). 
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consent is not possible under any configuration of social life. Yet the ap-
proval of central authority will work, if at all, only when societies are al-
ready formed. The gated community and condominium association have 
elaborate governance mechanisms that stem from a common landlord whose 
function is, to paraphrase Harold Demsetz, to internalize the externalities 
that are associated with land use.21 But even these property arrangements—
subdivisions, condominiums—start with unanimous consent, which is ob-
tained by the contracts that allow matters into the group in the first place. 
Understanding how these various regimes work gives us a window into 
dealing with our modern system of government regulation as it relates to 
both traditional zoning and modern environmental objectives. 
This lack of any social organization in primitive times effectively ruled 
out a top-down creation of a system of property rights. Locke makes that 
point most vividly when he observes that the acorn belongs to him who 
takes it from the tree.22 The father of the proposition that the state rules only 
with the consent of the governed was sensitive to the limitations on the role 
of consent in establishing property rights when he asks: “[W]as it a robbery 
thus to assume to himself what belonged to all in common? If such a con-
sent as that was necessary, man had starved, notwithstanding the plenty God 
had given him.”23 Locke understood that a system of common consent is so 
unfeasible that people take the acorn first and ask questions later. It seems 
clear that the problem of coordination rules out in the early stages of social 
development any top-down system of property rights. A decentralized sys-
tem of bottom-up rights was a historical necessity that cannot be denied or 
readily undone one thousand years later. A more technical way to put the 
basic point is that to require coordination in a primitive state of affairs is to 
usher in an era of mass starvation, which is hardly evidence of an efficient 
allocation of scarce resources. The somber implication of this process is that 
the rule of unilateral possession is strictly necessary, from which hardly 
follows that the mechanism is perfect, notwithstanding its ubiquity in primi-
tive cultures. The better implication is that the creation of new systems of 
property rights may eliminate some major problems but will also introduce 
smaller ones in their stead. Imperfections are always a brute fact of life. So 
the challenge is now set: How does one set out the contours of private prop-
erty to deal with the allocation issues so necessary for wealth creation and 
preservation? 
  
 21. Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 347, 348 (1967) (“A 
primary function of property rights is that of guiding incentives to achieve a greater internalization of 
externalities.”). 
 22. JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT AND A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION 112 
(Ian Shapiro ed., Yale Univ. Press 2003) (1690). 
 23. Id. 
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Temporal Externalities  
The first question is surprisingly simple but is one that was the source 
of extensive legal disputation, with profound social implications. To start 
with the simplest case, suppose that one takes the acorn, what bundle of 
rights does that possession give? And, then, in the age of agriculture, to 
occupy land, what does that occupation give? In line with the Demsetzian 
view (and long before it was formalized), the answer was that possession 
gave ownership of an indefinite duration, for both chattels and land. One 
explanation for this result is that it meant that people did not have to keep 
their acorns in hand, in order to preserve their rights, and prowl the bounda-
ries of their land. They kept possession of what they owned until they either 
consumed it, sold it, or evinced some clear and unambiguous sign of aban-
donment, which could not be lightly inferred for assets of positive market 
value.  
This rule of permanent ownership for land had powerful consequences. 
By giving people the long time horizons, it allowed individuals to make 
intelligent choices on investment, consumption, and saving. The person who 
sowed the plants could harvest the crops, which meant that they would put 
seeds into the ground in the first place. Yet since that party kept both the 
crops and the land, any decision that compromised the value of the land to 
increase the yield of the crops was fully internalized, so the single owner 
would get the upside and downside of all decisions on whether to keep 
crops or timber on land. To anticipate modern concerns, the environmental 
soundness of that temporal decision is evident when one looks at the har-
vesting programs that take place today on government owned land. There is 
a built-in incentive for commercial firms to clear-cut land because they do 
not bear the costs in the reduction in value, in large measure because gov-
ernments, given political pressures, do not enter into contracts that force 
these costs back on the cutters. It is yet another instance in which the mod-
ern preference for public ownership creates the dangerous negative external-
ities that one feature of the traditional system of property law avoids. The 
proof of the pudding is in the eating. The same timber companies operate in 
very different fashion on their own private lands because the needed inter-
nalization does take place. It is sobering to realize how a debate over the 
meaning of possession that dates back to Roman law has such powerful 
implications for modern political discourse. 
Spatial Externalities  
The temporal dimension is one dimension over which externalities may 
take place. But it is not the only dimension over which these conflicts mat-
ter. The question of negative spillovers to neighboring lands and waters, 
both public and private, is also a part of the overall situation that a sound 
system of private property rights has to address. Within the traditional legal 
system, this question is often encompassed in three heads of law: trespass 
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(i.e., unlawful entrance) onto the land of another; cattle trespass (unlawful 
entrance by one’s animals); and nuisance (creation of noxious conditions—
discharges, odors, noise, and the like) that starts on the property of one 
owner and migrates over to that of another. The mere fact that these bodies 
of law are of very ancient lineage should be sufficient to dispose once and 
for all of the common misconception that ancient and medieval systems of 
ownership were deficient because they rested on some naïve assumption 
that all property owners should be able to do exactly what they will with 
what they own, no matter what consequences their actions have on others.24 
Yet there never was a time when the ownership of land gave one the right to 
use it in ways that damage others: sic utero tuo ut alienum non laedas 
(therefore use your own so that you do not harm others) is a maxim of very 
old and honorable lineage.25 To be sure, the maxim has to be refined to give 
an account of what counts as a harm, as for example, in cases that deny 
rights of recovery to persons who claim harm when others build on nearby 
land in ways that block light or air.26 But no matter how those refinements 
are made, it becomes clear from the outset that the common law system of 
property rights was conscious of the correlative harms that the actions of 
one individual could have on another. The loss internalization norm was at 
work in these cases, and understanding its role in private disputes is critical 
to set the stage in figuring out the appropriate scope of government regula-
tion in more modern contexts.27 
To attack this problem, it is useful to look at matters in two separate 
states of the world. There are a few important complications that arise when 
the parties are not in symmetrical positions with each other, as when one is 
uphill to the other (where local customs may pick up the key variations). 
But for these purposes, the basic arguments can be understood by ignoring 
those complexities and assuming a perfect symmetry between the positions 
of two or more landowners. In its most exacting conditions, this involves 
landowners that have the same kind of land use patterns. Solving this prob-
lem gives a window into explaining how zoning and environmental law 
should operate when the complexities of multiple parties (as in pollution 
cases) preclude the obvious use of private litigation to adjudicate the differ-
ences. The overarching theme is that the substantive principles that aid in 
wealth creation in private disputes work in more modern contexts.  
  
 24. For one modern recognition of the point, see J.W. Harris, Who Owns My Body, 16 OXFORD J. 
LEGAL STUD. 55, 60 (1996), noting that with property-independent prohibitions, “[i]t is criminal to 
commit assault or homicide with a weapon, but it is completely irrelevant whether the accused owned 
the weapon or not.” 
 25. See NICHOLAS, supra note 17, at 154 (“[N]o enjoyment can ever be absolute in the sense that it 
is free from any restrictions whatever. At the very least the use, enjoyment, and abuse of his property by 
one owner must be reconciled with the equal use, enjoyment, and abuse by all other owners of their 
property.”).  
 26. See, e.g., Fontainebleau Hotel Corp. v. Forty-Five Twenty-Five, Inc., 114 So. 2d 357, 369-70 
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1959).  
 27. On this problem generally, see Epstein, supra note 5. 
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The question then is how do we decide the boundary conditions be-
tween two neighbors? Their status as neighbors means that one brute fact of 
nature limits their flexibility in resolving disputes. Neither party can just 
move away, for avoiding the dispute means abandoning the property. It is 
for good reason that rules of trespass and nuisance, whether by custom or 
law, form the oldest branches of tort law. The rules governing harms arising 
out of contracts, such as malpractice, occupier’s liability, and (even most of) 
product liability, can wait for a later day. People can protect themselves in 
how they choose their trading partners. They cannot, before planned unit 
developments, protect themselves by choosing their neighbors. 
How, then, is it best to shape trespass and nuisance law? The first bind-
ing constraint, which remains applicable in other contexts dealing with 
wealth creation, is generalizability. No one can say, consistent with rule of 
law values, that I can harm you in ways that you cannot harm me: persons 
have equal rights in the state of nature. This equality constraint is widely 
understood to be a fairness norm, but it is one that has powerful benefits 
from an efficiency standpoint. There is only one position of parity and 
countless variations, running in both directions, on the theme of relative 
privilege. By foreclosing all these dangerous alternatives among neighbors 
(and indeed all strangers), it is hard for any person to game the system, as 
their own personal welfare will be better off only to the extent that the li-
ability rules that they embrace benefit everyone else as well. 
So the question is, if “n” persons each own identical plots of land, what 
rules would they choose if high transaction costs make it impossible for 
them to bargain to maximize the joint value of their respective holdings? In 
each case, they are, given the symmetrical assumptions of this model, be-
hind a perfect Rawlsian veil.28 Any effort they have to expand their rights as 
land users will hurt them when they suffer the fall out from the parallel uses 
by others. So their incentives are for honest revelations on institutional 
choices to maximize that gap between benefit and cost. 
This assumption explains why tort protection against trespasses to land 
enjoys such universal support. If each person could enter the land of a 
neighbor at will, then each person could disrupt the gains that come from 
clearing the land, planting crops, or building structures. Good fences turn 
out to make good neighbors. The clear empirical prediction is that even if 
we take into account the (relatively low) costs of enforcement, each 
neighbor will be better off with the injunction than without it, save in rare 
cases where one enters the land of another to escape some imminent peril to 
  
 28. For his classical exposition, see JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971). Note that Rawls 
thought that his formula was most valuable in figuring out nonutilitarian reasons for doing certain kinds 
of actions. But its great strength lies in its ability to elicit honest preferences about how legal institutions 
should be arranged precisely because it puts people in a position whereby, with the knowledge that they 
have at their disposal, the only way they can do well by themselves is to do well by others at the same 
time. A test of this sort may go astray in some cases, but when applied consistently, it will get very close 
to some social optimum. 
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life or limb.29 This looks to be true even in the odd case when there are only 
two neighbors. But since this discussion focuses on real property, it is criti-
cal to remember that most people will have multiple adjacent neighbors, in 
addition to having other nonadjacent landowners in the vicinity who may be 
affected by their actions. The multiple threats of entry are forestalled by this 
rule, which produces even larger gains than we might expect. The rule 
therefore obviates the need for thousands of voluntary transactions, all of 
which could flounder in the absence of a true competitive setting. It hardly 
will do to get 99% of your neighbors to sign a noninterference policy if the 
remaining few can savage the land. Neighbors are determined by geogra-
phy, and unlike suppliers, you can’t get another one because you don’t like 
the one you have. Once again, the rules that carry the greatest moral ur-
gency are easiest to defend by some simple utilitarian calculations. The rea-
son why socially these moral intuitions play such an enormous role is that 
they spare everyone the need to rework the social calculations from the 
ground up each time the problem comes up.30 For repetitive situations, habit 
and custom are cheaper and more reliable than conscious deliberative com-
putation. So we have clear reasons why this boundary matters. 
It is more difficult to deal with nuisance cases, where no single answer 
is sufficient to cover the full range of situations. The first point to note is 
that nuisances—smells, noise, gases, toxins—come in all sizes and shapes. 
In this context, the central truth is that the magnitude and distribution of the 
harms really matters and forces the kind of differentiation in legal response 
that is generally resisted in the law of trespass, where all entries tend to be 
treated alike.31 But in nuisances we shift course. Start with the major cases 
and it is clear that runoff that fouls soil and blocks agriculture is a big deal. 
The same is true of stench and sledgehammers. The usual legal rule treats 
these high-intensity nuisances as though they were trespasses and subjects 
them to a per se prohibition, which carries with it the right to damages for 
past harms and an injunction against future harms. 
At this point, however, the path of nuisance law tends to diverge from 
that of trespass for reasons that again reflect physical circumstances, not 
cultural differences. The typical injunction could demand a complete cessa-
tion of harm so that not one single drop of pollution could make it on a 
neighbor’s land. But at some point the precautions needed to stop that last 
tiny bit of harm dwarf the gains that they achieve. The situation here is 
  
 29. See, e.g., Vincent v. Lake Erie Transp. Co., 124 N.W. 221 (Minn. 1910); Ploof v. Putnam, 71 A. 
188 (Vt. 1908).  
 30. Jonathan Haidt, The Emotional Dog and Its Rational Tail: A Social Intuitionist Approach to 
Moral Judgment, 108 PSYCHOL. REV. 814 (2001). 
 31. For an early expression of this view, see Dougherty v. Stepp, 18 N.C. 371, 371 (1835), stating: 
The amount of damages may depend on the acts done on the land, and the extent of injury to 
it therefrom. But it is an elementary principle that every unauthorized, and therefore unlaw-
ful, entry into the close of another, is a trespass. From every such entry against the will of the 
possessor the law infers some damage; if nothing more, the treading down the grass or the 
herbage, or as here, the shrubbery.  
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unlike the prohibition on actual entry, which is sensibly subject to a strong 
on/off switch.  
This treatment of the residual harms in major nuisance cases gives some 
insight as to the treatment of the second half of the problem: how to treat 
minor nuisances? Recall that the standard definitions of a nuisance are in-
sensitive to the magnitude question: any smell, noise, or discharge qualifies. 
But by that definition, no one could talk on his front patio or engage in any 
farming. It is therefore instructive that the recognition of a live-and-let-live 
principle has developed in these cases to allow low-level nuisances to con-
tinue by all parties, without compensation. The point of this large/small 
distinction is to correct the overprotection of land that comes from an un-
critical carryover of the law of trespass to nuisance.32 
The above logic explains that these deviations from the hard boundary 
conditions in the law of trespass count as Pareto improvements that should 
be welcomed in the ex ante position as yet another small means for wealth 
creation. The material from Baron Bramwell’s decision in Bamford v. 
Turnley33 shows that this was clearly perceived when the rule received its 
most sophisticated articulation in 1862.34 Hence courts require, on a recip-
rocal basis, that an injured party absorb, without compensation, damages 
for small levels of harm in ways that benefit all parties from behind the 
Rawlsian veil of ignorance. The rule increases land values for both parties 
  
 32. See Thomas W. Merrill, Trespass, Nuisance, and the Costs of Determining Property Rights, 14 
J. LEGAL STUD. 13 (1985). 
 33. [1862] 122 Eng. Rep. 27 (Exch. Div.). 
 34. Id. at 32-33. I quote the passage in full because it represents the most prescient judicial analysis 
of the economic and philosophical issues ever penned: 
The instances put during the argument, of burning weeds, emptying cess-pools, making 
noises during repairs, and other instances which would be nuisances if done wantonly or ma-
liciously, nevertheless may be lawfully done. It cannot be said that such acts are not nui-
sances, because, by the hypothesis, they are; and it cannot be doubted that, if a person mali-
ciously and without cause made close to a dwelling-house the same offensive smells as may 
be made in emptying a cesspool, an action would lie. Nor can these cases be got rid of as ex-
treme cases, because such cases properly test a principle. Nor can it be said that the jury settle 
such questions by finding there is no nuisance, though there is. . . . There must be, then, some 
principle on which such cases must be excepted. It seems to me that that principle may be de-
duced from the character of these cases, and is this, viz., that those acts necessary for the 
common and ordinary use and occupation of land and houses may be done, if conveniently 
done, without subjecting those who do them to an action. . . . There is an obvious necessity 
for such a principle as I have mentioned. It is as much for the advantage of one owner as of 
another; for the very nuisance the one complains of, as the result of the ordinary use of his 
neighbour’s land, he himself will create in the ordinary use of his own, and the reciprocal 
nuisances are of a comparatively trifling character. The convenience of such a rule may be 
indicated by calling it a rule of give and take, live and let live.  
  . . . . 
  . . . The public consists of all the individuals of it, and a thing is only for the public bene-
fit when it is productive of good to those individuals on the balance of loss and gain to all. So 
that if all the loss and all the gain were borne and received by one individual, he on the whole 
would be a gainer. But whenever this is the case,—whenever a thing is for the public benefit, 
properly understood,—the loss to the individuals of the public who lose will bear compensa-
tion out of the gains of those who gain. It is for the public benefit there should be railways, 
but it would not be unless the gain of having the railway was sufficient to compensate the 
loss occasioned by the use of the land required for its site; and accordingly no one thinks it 
would be right to take an individual’s land without compensation to make a railway. 
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to a dispute from the ex ante perspective, which obviates any distributional 
concerns that might otherwise arise. In addition, its requirements easily 
generalize to cover multiple parties.  
Thus far the analysis has covered only those cases in which there are 
physical invasions of the property of another. Often times there are other 
kinds of disputes that involve conduct on one piece of land that does not 
invade the property of another but which nonetheless causes serious disloca-
tions. Here are two examples that tend to require different solutions. The 
first case involves the problem of lateral support. Dig out your land and the 
nearby land will fall over. The same logic that governs the live-and-let-live 
cases takes over, only now we speak of background restrictions on land use 
so that both, or indeed, all landowners on level land cannot dig out to the 
boundary line if the nearby land will fall. The strong obligation, however, 
does not extend to cases where the support is required for structures built 
close to the boundary—for here the fear is that some unilateral preemptive 
action of the first-to-build will result in the gain of rights over a neighbor 
who is, for all practical purposes, powerless to stop them. The weaker alter-
native requires each landowner to give notice to neighbors before the work 
begins so that, if need be, they can shore up their own foundations. And 
knowing of the rules, one option for the first-to-build owner is to avoid the 
problem by building back from the boundary line. We have here yet another 
instance where the recognition of noninvasive nuisances improves overall 
social welfare. 
The second instance deals with claims for an easement of light or view, 
already alluded to in connection with the discussion of the sic utero maxim. 
Should building so as to block light or view be treated as a nuisance for any 
loss it causes to land values? That argument has been widely rejected in the 
judge-made law tradition of most countries and for good reason—namely 
that it encourages premature development to perfect one’s right to build. 
The point here is that the first-to-build gets to stop the second from build-
ing. If that were allowed, then why could the second not stop the original 
builder to protect his own options? The risks here show the importance of 
parity in the initial position: parity can only be preserved if either both or 
neither have the right to build, independent of what the other does first. In 
general, both plots of land are worth more with development rights. And 
what is true here with two neighbors applies with many neighbors. Could 
the first-to-build stop twenty nearby owners from exercising the like privi-
lege? Clearly the answer has to be no. Even if we allow for Pareto im-
provements that alter the original real estate balance, this proposed ease-
ment of view or light does not qualify for that treatment. 
Variation by Contract 
The overall situation, however, has still not drawn to a close. It may 
well be that parties are in identical positions at the outset. But with differen-
tial investment strategies, they could easily alter that balance. One addi-
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tional benefit of the relatively clear rules for governing boundary disputes is 
that they set a robust baseline for further negotiations where one party wants 
to buy out rights from another. In the simplest case, one person can simply 
purchase outright the land of a neighbor. Now being a sole owner of both, 
all losses are internalized: Any runoff or pollution from one part of the land 
only harms another part of land owned by the same person. The purchase 
option allows for the internalization of the externality. 
Most often, however, the outright purchase is not feasible because the 
neighbor has undertaken some investments in his land that are of more 
value to him than a potential purchaser. Fortunately, the overall system of 
property law allows for the partition of assets by permitting the purchase of 
limited interests in land, which could include the right to walk or ride over 
the land (an easement to commit what would otherwise be a trespass); to 
have runoff on the land in question (ditto for pollution); or to impose height 
or setback conditions to preserve light and view. These transactions do not 
allow either party separately, or the two jointly, to increase the burdens on 
third persons, so the mutual gain between the parties counts in fact as a so-
cial benefit. And since land use arrangements are of long duration, the law 
in virtually all societies holds that the easements or covenants so created 
will, with an observation of minimum formalities, benefit and bind subse-
quent parties on both sides of the transactions.35 The bottom line here is that 
a system of voluntary contract is available to correct any misallocations of 
resources that are introduced by the basic system of land law.  
In most cases among strangers, however, these arrangements are hard to 
negotiate. In some cases, getting a right of view or light over one’s 
neighbor’s property, for example, may not matter much unless others join 
in. It seems clear that most parties are generally not able to negotiate this 
transaction voluntarily, which explains why use rights and disposition rights 
must be coupled together in any systematic understanding of a sound prop-
erty rights regime. There is, however, one critical area in which extensive 
reassignment of rights does take place: planned unit developments. In these 
cases, the bargaining difficulties are obviated because we start with the sin-
gle owner of a large parcel of land who is able to divide property among all 
purchasers in ways that create an elaborate network of easements and cove-
nants among them.  
There are several key features about this system. First, once the system 
of recordation is in place, it is no longer necessary to preserve any legal 
difference in treatment between easements (that allow entry) and covenants 
(which impose additional restrictions) on property. Both are properly gov-
erned by the unified set of rules which insure that their benefits and burdens 
run for all persons, regardless of when they buy into the common scheme.  
  
 35. For a convenient compilation of the rules, see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: 
SERVITUDES (2000). For my own views on how recordation and notice increase the scope of contractual 
freedom in the domain of servitudes, see Richard A. Epstein, Notice and Freedom of Contract in the 
Law of Servitudes, 55 S. CAL. L. REV. 1353 (1982). 
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Second, the common owner has the right incentives to get the correct 
mix of servitudes over the property. Any benefit he gives to one party in-
creases the market value of the relevant parcel of land. Any burden he im-
poses on one party reduces that market value. The only way to maximize 
private gains is to develop and elaborate a reciprocal network of benefits 
and burdens that produces the largest net gains for customers. The internali-
zation of all benefits and losses thus solves the Demsetz externality prob-
lem. The upshot is that the system of voluntary transfers functions well be-
cause it respects the full range of property rights and thus allows for their 
accurate valuation in all sorts of transactions. 
Third, these planned unit developments are capable of having a varia-
tion that no background rules of common law could supply. The particular 
choice of covenants can properly reflect the income and taste preferences of 
the prospective members in the restrictions that they place on private use 
and on the organization of the common areas. In general, the higher the in-
come levels of association members, the more critical the soft amenities. 
More generally, these agreements almost never cut down on the protection 
between neighbors that are included in the background rules of the legal 
system. Yet they typically do much to impose reciprocal easements and 
covenants; they typically add common areas as well; and they almost al-
ways put in place governance structures, which often resemble corporate or 
nonprofit boards, to deal with changes that need to be made down the road. 
The explanation for all these developments relates to one powerful 
theme: valuable property for high income individuals offers real opportuni-
ties to use private information to improve on overall performance. Relying 
on the initiatives of a single owner cuts down on the transaction costs 
needed to implement the system that aligns the incentives of all players for 
the reasons noted above. In addition, the external effects of these arrange-
ments on third persons are likely to be positive; after all, any nuisance-like 
activity will be quickly enjoined within the association, and no alteration of 
rights among its members improves their collective position as against 
strangers to their transaction. The substantive provisions of these agree-
ments therefore give some sense of how public arrangements ought to be 
made, a topic to which we shall turn later. 
MOVEMENT INTO THE PUBLIC SPHERE 
A Modest Transformation 
One implicit assumption of my basic argument, so critical for under-
standing the destruction of wealth in the public sphere, is that the rules of 
engagement developed in the private law should in principle shape our un-
derstanding of the full range of public law problems dealing with these land 
use conflicts. Most critical to this argument is that the set of rights devel-
oped through the private law are complete, consistent, and well-defined, and 
work relentlessly toward the optimization of land values. One might assume 
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therefore that no improvements were possible, but that conclusion is itself 
incorrect for two reasons. The first of these is that the private rules them-
selves do not address enforcement issues for violations, for which private 
rights of action are often inappropriate for severe nuisances (not caught by 
the live-and-let-live rules) from multiple sources that impact on large num-
bers of persons. Second, in cases of initial separate ownership, high transac-
tion costs could often block the adoption of a new set of covenants and 
easements (often reciprocal) that could improve overall land values. The 
first issue here is how the public law should deal with these questions. The 
second issue is whether the current framework of takings law works well on 
these matters, which, as will become evident from a discussion of a few key 
Supreme Court cases, it does not. 
A convenient place to start this analysis is with the obvious parallel to 
cases of public nuisance, a well-developed head of law, in which a private 
party pollutes, say, a river or lake. Here, one possibility is that all riparians 
could join together in a class action to deal with the situation, which creates 
immense procedural complexities. Or the state could sue to enjoin the nui-
sance. The emphasis here is on the substance, and the key rule of transfor-
mation from the private to the public space is this: the state has the same 
rights, no more no less, as any private owner under the law of trespass and 
nuisance. The efficient rules for dealing with private/private interactions set 
the stage for private/ public interactions. 
The same argument could apply to subjects like air pollution, which in-
volve the creation of many simultaneous nuisances that do harm to many 
private individuals. Again the choice in these cases is often between class 
actions and direct systems of enforcement, which may well involve complex 
schemes of direct regulation. But again, the procedural issues, so vital in 
practice, only raise second order questions. The first order considerations 
involve the interaction between damages and injunctions, and on this issue, 
the point to stress is that total elimination of all pollution makes no more 
sense in the public arena than in the private, for live-and-let-live is the op-
erative principle in both settings. The trick is to reduce the pollution to ac-
ceptable levels, which are positive and not zero. What level is optimal will 
often be a subject of disputation. As the discussion of private real estate 
developments in gated communities and subdivisions indicated, the higher 
the level of affluence, the lower the level of pollution.  
That same principle should apply in the public sphere, as it is generally 
the case that people at the margin prefer to equate the last dollar that they 
spend on private comfort with the last dollar that they spend on shared 
amenities that they can only acquire by public means. Put in its simplest 
form, no one wants to build a mansion on a public road filled with potholes, 
located in a region permeated with stench. And they will pay for controlling 
both if given the opportunity to do so, which makes it all the more impera-
tive that systems of taxation be used in the first instance to provide public 
goods and not to secure covert redistribution of wealth between interest 
groups, each of which is intent to pass on to others a disproportionate share 
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of common burden. The actual operation of the scheme need not place a 
straightjacket on the behavior of state and local governments. In principle, 
regional variations in allowable pollution levels make sense if they lead to 
intelligent groups of high- and low-intensity activities in separate districts. 
The basic contours of environmental law are an outgrowth of the correct 
understanding of the private law rules. 
A similar analysis could apply to the restrictive covenants between 
strangers that are blocked by high transaction costs. The state here imposes 
the applicable rule on all parties, subject to this constraint. It seeks to adopt 
only those rules which improve overall value, which obviates any need to 
consider cash compensation for losers. That result could be achieved, for 
example, with various rules that regulate exterior appearance, where all 
parties benefit because signs, walls, or exteriors adhere to common 
schemes, as in planned unit developments. One simple expedient is to keep 
signs flush on walls, which improves both appearance and visibility. These 
rules prevent a destructive prisoner’s dilemma game by making it impossi-
ble for first one, and then all, to build perpendicular signs that frustrate both 
objectives. In general, however, these opportunities for constructive re-
straints are likely to be hard to come by given that the differences in initial 
positions among the various landowners raise the prospect that what works 
for some will be a detriment to others. This theme of disproportionate im-
pact should, but often does not, play a critical role in the analysis of various 
land use regulations. 
The Modern Approach: The Disintegration of Property Rights 
Zoning  
The above paragraphs sketch out in brief form how modern forms of 
regulation should build on the older system of common law rights. All of 
these moves are surely legal under current law, which cannot be reproached 
on the grounds that it affords insufficient flexibility to achieve the objec-
tives of the private law system. But modern doctrines now go far beyond 
these well-specified parameters in deciding on the permissible scope of 
government regulation. The initial impulse in this direction arose in connec-
tion with zoning cases that had to ask this simple question: when the state 
had a vision of proper land use allocation that did not fit the earlier model, 
did it have to pay compensation to those landowners whose property values 
were reduced by the restrictions on use that the state imposed? To the good 
private lawyer, there is no principled distinction between the property status 
of restrictive covenants and the property status of easements. To be sure, the 
former allows one or more persons to prevent people from making the kinds 
of use of their property that the common law system allowed. The second 
allows landowners to use other people’s property in ways that the common 
law prohibited. A height restriction is an illustration of the first kind of re-
striction, and an easement to walk over land, or to move vehicles over land, 
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is an instance of the second. Within a voluntarist universe, both of these 
kinds of relationships are welcomed on the simple ground that so long as all 
parties to the transaction have given their sense, there are likely to be gains 
from trade that improve overall wealth. 
The United States Supreme Court rejected the unity of covenants and 
easements starting with its decision in Village of Euclid, Ohio v. Ambler 
Realty Co.,36 which held that a local decision to divide a unified tract of land 
suitable for industrial development into three separate zones—industrial, 
apartment houses, and single homes—did not require any compensation 
even though it reduced the value of the property by between 75%-80%.37 It 
is critical to dispense with the false rationales that have been used to defend 
this result. One is that the losses sustained in these cases are no different 
from those which involve losses from competition or from blocking views 
and rights of way. Hence these cases are sometimes treated as though they 
involve only the “mere diminution” in value. Thus Justice Brennan’s influ-
ential remark in Penn Central, “the decisions sustaining other land-use 
regulations, which, like the New York City [landmark preservation statute], 
are reasonably related to the promotion of the general welfare, uniformly 
reject the proposition that diminution in property value, standing alone, can 
establish a ‘taking,’” links explicitly back to Euclid.38 But his point is surely 
wrong because the diminution in value stems not merely from what other 
people do with their rights under the common law framework, as by build-
ing a house next door, but explicitly from stripping out use rights from the 
initial bundle that inhered in the landowner. The claim here is for damages 
attributable to the fractional interest in rights, which is denied on the ground 
that one cannot “take” property rights that are nonpossessory in nature. 
A second argument in these cases is that the regulations here, by relying 
on these zones, should be understood as a way to prevent various kinds of 
nuisances. But at this point, the term “nuisance” is a metaphor, for we do 
not have anything that looks like a physical invasion from the ordinary de-
velopment. Nor is the case one that falls within the class of reciprocal nui-
sances under the live-and-let-live rules. Put otherwise, a factory, unlike a 
rancid cesspool, is not a nuisance per se. One waits until it emits some 
harmful odor, noise, or filth and then enjoins that noxious behavior. Most 
critically, the law should show little, if any, sympathy for the argument that 
the shut down would cause major disruptions. The simple answer is that the 
strong ex post sanction means that in a prior stage, the developer will be 
sure not to stray too close to that line. But once we start to say, as does Jus-
tice Sutherland, that “[a] nuisance [could] be [the] right thing in the wrong 
place,—like a pig in the parlor,”39 then we have lost the war of analogies, 
for a factory on a large plot of land that emits no odors and no filth cannot 
  
 36. 272 U.S. 365 (1926). 
 37. Id. at 396-97.  
 38. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 131 (1978). 
 39. Euclid, 272 U.S. at 388. 
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in good conscience be treated as though it were somehow a nuisance. The 
expansion of the category of wrongs can proceed without limit so that in the 
end, we feel ourselves collectively entitled to enjoin just about any devel-
opment in a particular location if we can muster the political will to do it. 
How, one might add, does this relate to the question of wealth creation? 
It relates simply because of the established numbers. We know that a social 
loss is necessarily tied to the reduction in value of the land. And there is no 
reason why that private loss should be kept off the social ledger solely be-
cause it is concentrated on a single person and not shared by other members 
of the community. The effect on overall social wealth is the same, regard-
less of its incidence. And in political terms, the situation is worse because 
the ability to isolate a single person increases the likelihood that political 
factions will repeat the tactic in the future. The simple question, therefore, 
we have to ask is, where are the systematic gains that offset this loss? The 
only place we can look is to the gains from neighbors. The large gains from 
the prevention of common law nuisances are by assumption not there, so we 
have to look to what I like to call “soft” externalities—the improvement in 
the amenities of people nearby.40 But these are hard to determine without 
knowing the composition of the nearby properties and the actual operations 
of the plant that is no longer built. It could easily be that many neighbors 
could prefer to have a plant that offers employment opportunities and does 
not put pressure on other forms of local infrastructure, like schools. So even 
if we thought that the amenities from no plant were positive, it is highly 
unlikely that they are equal in magnitude to the losses concentrated on the 
single person (even if we put all the political costs to one side).  
In any event, there remains a simple and effective way for government 
to deal with those difficulties should they crop up. Just buy the land and 
then resell it subject to restrictive covenants that remove the obnoxious fea-
tures and preserve those which are desired. These are not fanciful possibili-
ties, for preservation societies do this all the time when they take preserva-
tion servitudes over private properties in order to preserve, for example, 
their facades for public benefit. Now the state through eminent domain (or a 
private society through contract) is internalizing the externalities in the fash-
ion that Demsetz thought was appropriate for the creation of property rights, 
so the original logic of the system holds through its modern variations. De-
cide Euclid the other way, and the nuisance law remains if the factory gets 
out of hand, and the condemnation power remains if it does not. The effi-
ciency of the zoning system was not investigated by Justice Sutherland or, 
regrettably, by any Justices who have unthinkingly followed that fateful 
decision. 
  
 40. For discussion in connection with the morals heading of the police power, see Richard A. Ep-
stein, Externalities Everywhere?: Morals and the Police Power, 21 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 61 (1997). 
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Just Compensation  
We can now address the fatal disjunction in takings law between the 
public law and private conceptions of private property. The private law rec-
ognizes no viable distinction between acquiring easements (to cause nui-
sances to neighbors) or acquiring covenants (to enjoin conduct, such as that 
pertaining to air and light). Following this one principle shapes the entire 
field of takings law by radically truncating the situations where state regula-
tion may proceed without some compensation to the aggrieved owner. Some 
examples follow. 
Ask first whether the state should be able to impose height and setback 
restrictions on individuals in order to improve the views of others. Start with 
this simple situation. Assume that A owns land worth $100,000, which is 
free and clear of all encumbrances. He then sells for $30,000 a restrictive 
covenant to his neighbor B that binds him not to build over thirty feet. We 
will assume that the covenant increases the value of B’s land by $35,000 
and reduces that of A’s by $25,000 so that both benefit from the deal. The 
state now condemns A’s land and offers to pay $75,000, the market value of 
the land, to A. It offers nothing to B on the ground that it has not taken her 
property. Surely something is deeply amiss about this rule. The assignment 
of a partial interest in property should not increase or decrease the rights and 
duties that both A and B have against the world. The right answer therefore 
requires the state to condemn the covenant from B at its fair market value so 
that it has to pay her $35,000. It would be utterly indefensible to assume 
that the state has not taken her restrictive covenant because it cannot go into 
possession of a covenant, given that it has rights over the land of another. 
One may as well say that all intellectual property is deprived of constitu-
tional protection for the same reason. The obvious answer is that the state 
has a choice. If it condemns A’s land alone, then it takes it subject to the 
covenant. If it wants the land free and clear, then it condemns both. It would 
be the height of folly to say that the state only triggers its obligations under 
the Takings Clause when it enters into possession of the land. A possessory 
takings doctrine has no application to ius in re aliena, rights in the land of 
another, when these are, as with covenants, nonpossessory. 
The situation involved with zoning is not radically discontinuous be-
cause these use restrictions should be regarded as a network of restrictive 
covenants. In dealing with these cases, the burden of covenants in all situa-
tions is a taking of property. But the question is whether cash compensation 
is owed. To answer that question, we have to distinguish between two pure 
types, recognizing that some intermediate cases will occur. The first situa-
tion is that of so-called average reciprocity of advantage, where each party 
benefits in like fashion from the restrictions imposed on others. At that 
point, the regulation contains, as I am fond of saying, implicit-in-kind com-
pensation. All members of the group are better off than before, so the regu-
lation overcomes the transactional obstacles that separate the parties without 
taking advantage of some for the benefit of others. The prospect of uniform 
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improvement across a class thus reduces the danger of factional struggle. It 
also means when property values increase for both sides that no cash com-
pensation is owing. That conclusion does not depend on any supposed con-
ceptual obstacle to the taking of nonpossessory interests. Rather, the result 
comes from a consistent application of the rules on implicit-in-kind com-
pensation, which in this context point to the compensation embedded in the 
regulation. And in those cases where the compensation is partial, cash 
should be used to top off the state’s obligation.  
The second situation involves use restrictions that differentially hurt 
some landowners on net and help others. These dangerous situations allow 
dominant interest groups to achieve through regulation, while paying noth-
ing, covenants that they would have to purchase if acquired privately. No 
one person can tell his neighbor not to build in ways that block his view of 
the sea. But allowing a zoning ordinance to achieve that result without com-
pensation pushes conflict into the public arena, where the absence of clear 
property rights—the development rights of one party are now up for 
grabs—manifestly invites the waste of public resources. The no-
compensation rule also aggravates all the temporal issues by giving the first-
to-build an advantage over the second, which the private law has systemati-
cally denied, and for good reasons. It also leads to the odd conclusion that 
you have to pay in voluntary transactions but may confiscate in involuntary 
ones. The unmistakable impact is to give huge incentives to depart from the 
voluntary market for private advantage. To counter these deep pathologies, 
the basic rule should be that cases of disproportionate impact should be 
enjoined unless compensation is paid so that the losers are not hurt by the 
social initiative. The compensation requirement has more than distributional 
effects. It sets prices and creates incentives for beneficial political behavior, 
here by applying rules that work in the private sector. 
This general approach suggests the dominant view that allows regula-
tions—without compensation—to restrict the ability to build ordinary 
homes in coastal areas, to require habitat to be set aside for endangered spe-
cies, to limit construction in or drainage of wetlands, or to require no growth 
or development zones are all in profound error. The point here is not the 
Kelo41 question of whether these activities should be allowed to go forward 
at all. We can freely concede that the regulations are for public use. But the 
want of compensation means that government regulators will also push for 
regulations that have any positive value to them because they will perceive 
the cost to the owner as carrying with it a zero price. Yet no social calculus 
is correct if it counts the benefits to the winners but ignores the costs to the 
losers. But this is what this form of regulation does. 
The point here is not just theoretical, but after this theoretical discus-
sion, a real life story helps put matters into context. In the famous American 
  
 41. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005).  
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decision, Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,42 the question was 
whether a regulation that prohibited a landowner from building on coastal 
dunes counted as a taking when it reduced the value of a plot from $250,000 
to zero (a real social loss).43 The Supreme Court held that it did, even if it 
did not embrace the view that any lesser reduction in price should receive 
the same treatment (which it should if marginal incentives are to be pre-
served).44 The case was graphic because in consequence the Coastal Council 
was required to purchase the land outright, for its market value. It now had 
to internalize the full costs of its decision. What did it do? It sold the land of 
course. And to whom? Not to the neighbor who would pay $150,000 be-
cause he could use it as a side yard, but to an outsider, for the full $250,000, 
who was allowed to build just like Mr. Lucas. The moral: Talk here is 
cheap. People will talk about benefits they get from quiet and solitude but 
not when they have to pay for them. And that is what takings law, even on 
sensitive environmental issues, is about—getting the right incentives. How? 
By following the patterns developed with care and sensitivity in private 
disputes. 
Let me give one further illustration of how the breakdown in private law 
conceptions leads to genuine quandaries in the public law. In Nollan v. Cali-
fornia Coastal Commission,45 the landowner owned a small dilapidated 
property on the beach between the Pacific Ocean to the west and the Pacific 
Coast Highway (PCH) to the east.46 He requested permission to build a lar-
ger home in keeping with the neighborhood, which the commission was 
prepared to grant only if he ceded to the public a lateral easement across the 
front of his property that allowed people to walk across his land47—a clear 
public use, obviously. He balked and built the house anyhow, and the ques-
tion was whether the state could attach the condition to its permit.48 Justice 
Scalia held that it could not within the modern framework of takings law.49 
In his view, the state had a legitimate interest under the police power to pre-
serve a “viewing spot” that would allow people on the PCH to see the water. 
But it was a form of out-and-out-extortion for him to insist that he surrender 
his lateral easement when he sought to block that view spot. The great diffi-
culty in the case is associated with the doctrine of unconstitutional condi-
tions: if the state has the absolute right under the police power to block the 
new construction of the house, why can’t it grant it on the condition that 
Nollan cede the lateral easement? Thus, the critics of Nollan point out, quite 
sensibly, that the effect of the rule is to block gainful exchanges.50 The 
  
 42. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992). 
 43. Id. at 1003. 
 44. Id. at 1031-32. 
 45. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).  
 46. Id. at 827. 
 47. Id. at 828. 
 48. Id. at 829-30. 
 49. Id. at 841-42. 
 50. See Lee Anne Fennell, Revealing Options, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1401 (2005). 
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landowner values the right to build a new home at $100,000 and the loss of 
the easement at $20,000. The state values the viewing spot at $5,000 and the 
easement at $10,000. So both are better off with the switch than without it. 
The great risk, therefore, is that this tough rule will make these bargains 
unenforceable so that the state will just stick with blocking the new con-
struction, which is an inferior result. 
Whether that prediction will play out is open to speculation: The state 
might decide to allow the permit because it wants, for example, increases in 
taxes. But the deeper point here is that a better understanding of the rights 
structure obviates the need to go through this analysis in the first place. Re-
call that the private law of servitudes treats covenants and easements as part 
of a comprehensive whole. The state can claim a public easement only on 
payment of just compensation. So too it can claim the benefit of a public 
covenant for the same reason. At this point, there is no police power justifi-
cation that allows it by decree to wipe out the $100,000 in development 
rights. Nor does this strategy of choice work in this case, for it is just tanta-
mount to the standard form of coercion that gives a person the choice be-
tween her money or her life. Clearly, if forced to choose, she will surrender 
the former. But the law does all that it can to resist allowing this choice in 
the first place. So it is here. The Coastal Commission has given the land-
owner a choice between the surrender of a covenant and the surrender of an 
easement, when the landowner is entitled to both. So if she elects to surren-
der the lateral easement, then the state has to pay for the $20,000, as Scalia 
required. So these options strategies are effectively blunted, and in this case, 
we can now see what happens given the numbers. The state backs off the 
covenant because it does not wish to pay the $100,000 in private losses. It 
also backs off the lateral easement because it does not wish to pay $20,000 
for the $10,000 benefit. Knocking out the bundling strategy thus improves 
resource allocation because both interests are given their highest values. 
What Scalia missed was the importance of a complete set of property rights. 
What the critics missed was that their favored bargains induce all sorts of 
strategic behavior by government that seeks to exploit the weakness in the 
constitutional protection of private property. What the reader should not 
miss is that the strong system of private rights is the only way to make the 
takings law more coherent than it is. So long as the Justices think that there 
are two sets of rules—one for ordinary transactions and another for state 
transactions—they will flounder in this area. What is so desperately needed 
is an understanding of the deep conceptual unity of the public and private 
law. 
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